Next: The next departmental results edition can update outcomes. Departmental Plans update intentions only. A new NATO spending edition changes the spending comparison on its own perimeter.
DND reports higher spending and staffing, alongside substantial gaps in readiness and equipment serviceability; its project and Reserve Force indicators also need careful interpretation.
The answer
The latest completed departmental record shows reported spending and staffing alongside persistent delivery constraints. In fiscal 2024–25, DND reported about $33.9 billion in programme spending and 92,674 civilian and military full-time equivalents. The spending figure is nominal, not adjusted for inflation. These departmental totals use a different perimeter from NATO defence expenditure. Later spending commitments cannot establish what those earlier resources delivered.
DND reported 91.9% of the Regular Force establishment filled, while 69.0% of occupations had critical shortfalls. Those statements can both be true: a total headcount ratio does not establish the required mix of trained people. The separate Reserve Force figure cannot be read as a staffing completion rate because the department says it uses average paid strength divided by enrolled strength.
The reported readiness picture is more constrained. Force elements ready reached 61.3%, against the file’s 90.0% target. The measure of planned readiness for concurrent missions was 30.0%, against 90.0%. Neither is the percentage of missions Canada would win or the percentage of its territory it can defend.
The record supports a specific conclusion: spending, staffing, equipment serviceability and readiness are distinct quantities. A spending milestone alone cannot settle the capability question. The tables below keep those quantities separate and make changing targets and definitions part of the answer.
What this means for the decision
Judge a defence spending claim against the resources it counts, then ask separately about personnel mix, equipment availability, concurrent readiness and delivery against original approvals. The held record permits those checks; it does not permit a cost per ready force unit or a causal claim that a budget change produced an operational result.
The key uncertainty
Readiness is reported by the department and cannot be independently reconstructed from public force-level data. The reserve denominator differs from its label, project ratings are weighted, and targets or deadlines can change within a reporting cycle.
What would settle it
The next departmental results edition can update outcomes. Departmental Plans update intentions only. A new NATO spending edition changes the spending comparison on its own perimeter.
Public debate often starts with how much Canada spends on defence. The harder question is what those resources make possible: trained people, equipment that can be used, and the ability to sustain operations.
Evidence reviewed through 2026-09-09 · 15 cited sources · 1 member Resolution · 6 chapters
Resolution lineages behind this Brief: Canada's defence expenditure against NATO's 2%-of-GDP benchmark, across NATO's own estimate, Canada's committed… →
Review at each Departmental Results Report and Departmental Plan publication; recheck the TBS resource before a new reading. This edition was assessed September 9, 2026, using results through fiscal 2024–25 and plan rows through 2026–27. No automatic refresh is promised.
Chapter 1§
Where the money and people sit
Departmental spending and staffing rose, but the resource totals do not measure usable capability. The allocation shows which responsibilities carried the spending, and the time record keeps the reported plan beside the result.
The large prior-year movement includes a pension-account credit, not just operational spending. These are nominal departmental totals, narrower than NATO defence expenditure; FTEs are not deployable troops. The report’s rounded total exceeds the programme-level sum by $1.35.
Five fiscal years of reported resources
| Fiscal year | Programme rows | Actual spending ($B) | Actual FTEs |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2020–21 | 64 | 26.827 | 91,183 |
| 2021–22 | 64 | 24.126 | 91,094 |
| 2022–23 | 64 | 26.930 | 89,864 |
| 2023–24 | 64 | 33.469 | 90,587 |
| 2024–25 | 64 | 33.925 | 92,674 |
The latest plan comparison uses $30,584,803,954, the sum of the file’s planned_spending_1 for fiscal 2024–25, matched exactly to the original 2024–25 Departmental Plan. Later supplementary funding can change actual spending. Historical plan-vintage comparisons are withheld.
Source: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat — GC InfoBase — Departmental Plans and Results Reports: expenditures and full-time equivalents by program and organization. Sum of distinct DND programme identifiers within each fiscal year. Includes internal services; actual spending is on the departmental authorities-used basis.
The evidence behind this chapter: Canada's defence expenditure against NATO's 2%-of-GDP benchmark, across NATO's own estimate, Canada's committed… →
Chapter 2§
A fuller force can still lack the right people
Staffing totals conceal occupational gaps. Read the Regular Force establishment, critical occupations and Reserve Force proxy on their own definitions.
Reserve Force: 78.54 is a proxy. The row is labelled “positions filled”, but DND says accurate reporting on that basis is not currently possible. Its explanation uses average paid strength divided by total enrolled strength. No establishment-fill gap is calculated here.
Staffing and occupational shortfall history
| Fiscal year | Indicator | Published label | Reported result (%) | Issuer status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020-21 | DR-2009 | % of Regular force positions that are filled | 93.0 | to be achieved |
| 2020-21 | DR-2218 | % of occupations with critical shortfalls | 50.5 | not met |
| 2021-22 | DR-2009 | % of Regular force positions that are filled | 91.6 | to be achieved |
| 2021-22 | DR-2218 | % of occupations with critical shortfalls | 61.7 | not met |
| 2022-23 | DR-2009 | % of the Regular force Establishment that is filled | 88.7 | to be achieved |
| 2022-23 | DR-2218 | % of occupations with critical shortfalls | 70.0 | not met |
| 2023-24 | DR-2009 | % of the Regular Force Establishment that is filled | 89.1 | to be achieved |
| 2023-24 | DR-2218 | % of occupations with critical shortfalls | 72.9 | not met |
| 2024-25 | DR-2009 | % of the Regular Force Establishment that is filled | 91.9 | to be achieved |
| 2024-25 | DR-2218 | % of occupations with critical shortfalls | 69.0 | not met |
Source: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat — GC InfoBase — performance information by programme and organization. Core-responsibility indicators DR-2009, DR-2213 and DR-2218. Filling an authorized position is not proof of trained or deployable strength.
Chapter 3§
Usable equipment and readiness are separate tests
Compare each result with the target recorded for that measure. Maintenance is part of normal fleet operation, so universal serviceability is not a sensible benchmark.
Each vertical marker is the target recorded for that indicator, not a common standard. Planned maintenance is part of fleet operation; serviceability differs by environment. The concurrent-readiness figure concerns combinations of force elements, a model-based combination measure, not a success rate for missions.
The aerospace record contains a target change: the numeric target is 85%, the explanatory field records a reduction to 70%, and the stored status is “to be achieved”. Both target values and the issuer status remain visible; Countability substitutes none of them. “To be achieved” is the issuer’s label, not a Countability on-track verdict.
Source: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat — GC InfoBase — performance information by programme and organization. Reported results for fiscal 2024–25. No public force-level data independently verify these readings.
Chapter 4§
What the procurement indicators really measure
The project record distinguishes scope, schedule and expenditure authority. Its weighted ratings and revised approvals limit what the headline labels can establish.
These figures use weighted green/yellow/red project ratings and project complexity/risk weights. They are not an unweighted count of projects on time, in scope or on budget. The reference is the most recent approval, which may differ from the original promise.
The reported schedule indicator is much lower than the scope indicator. This is a difference between two rating-based measures; it does not reveal how many projects were delayed, the average delay, or whether a revised promise was met.
Source: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat — GC InfoBase — performance information by programme and organization. DR-2868, DR-2869 and DR-2870; new identifiers in the 2024–25 results. Earlier project indicators are retained in the historical record but not joined into a trend.
Chapter 5§
Keep the moving targets in view
A changed identifier, target or deadline is part of the evidence. The historical table preserves those changes without presenting a false continuous series.
A shared label or identifier does not guarantee a stable measure. New land, aerospace and procurement identifiers begin in fiscal 2024–25; even the continuing maritime identifier has changed wording and targets.
Results with the target and status stored in the same row
| Fiscal year | Indicator | Published label | Result (%) | Minimum target (%) | Maximum target (%) | Recorded target year/month | Issuer status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020-21 | DR-1995 | % of force elements that are ready for operations in accordance with established targets | 71.7 | 100.0 | — | 2025.0/3.0 | to be achieved |
| 2020-21 | DR-2007 | % of land fleets that are serviceable to meet training and readiness requirements | 62.7 | 70.0 | — | 2021.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2020-21 | DR-2176 | % of maritime key fleets that are serviceable to meet training and readiness requirements | 94.1 | 90.0 | — | 2021.0/3.0 | met |
| 2020-21 | DR-2183 | % of aerospace fleets that are serviceable to meet training and readiness requirements | 55.0 | 85.0 | — | 2021.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2020-21 | DR-2009 | % of Regular force positions that are filled | 93.0 | 95.0 | 100.0 | 2026.0/3.0 | to be achieved |
| 2020-21 | DR-2213 | % of Reserve force positions that are filled | 79.78 | 95.0 | 100.0 | 2026.0/3.0 | to be achieved |
| 2020-21 | DR-2218 | % of occupations with critical shortfalls | 50.5 | — | 5.0 | 2021.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2020-21 | DR-1298 | % of capital equipment projects that remain within approved expenditure authority | 94.12 | 100.0 | — | 2021.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2020-21 | DR-1545 | % of capital equipment projects that remain on approved schedule | 94.12 | 100.0 | — | 2021.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2020-21 | DR-2001 | % of capital equipment projects that remain in approved scope | 94.12 | 100.0 | — | 2021.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2021-22 | DR-1995 | % of force elements that are ready for operations in accordance with established targets | 71.0 | 100.0 | — | 2025.0/3.0 | to be achieved |
| 2021-22 | DR-2007 | % of land fleets that are serviceable to meet training and readiness requirements | 65.8 | 70.0 | — | 2022.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2021-22 | DR-2176 | % of maritime key fleets that are serviceable to meet training and readiness requirements | 54.0 | 90.0 | — | 2022.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2021-22 | DR-2183 | % of aerospace fleets that are serviceable to meet training and readiness requirements | 43.0 | 85.0 | — | 2022.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2021-22 | DR-2009 | % of Regular force positions that are filled | 91.6 | 95.0 | 100.0 | 2026.0/3.0 | to be achieved |
| 2021-22 | DR-2213 | % of Reserve force positions that are filled | 76.0 | 95.0 | — | 2026.0/3.0 | to be achieved |
| 2021-22 | DR-2218 | % of occupations with critical shortfalls | 61.7 | — | 5.0 | 2022.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2021-22 | DR-1298 | % of capital equipment projects that remain within most recent approved expenditure authority | 87.5 | 100.0 | — | 2022.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2021-22 | DR-1545 | % of capital equipment projects that remain on most recent approved schedule | 93.75 | 100.0 | — | 2022.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2021-22 | DR-2001 | % of capital equipment projects that remain in most recent approved scope | 93.8 | 100.0 | — | 2022.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2022-23 | DR-1995 | % of force elements that are ready for operations in accordance with established targets | 61.0 | 100.0 | — | 2025.0/3.0 | to be achieved |
| 2022-23 | DR-2007 | % of key land fleets that are serviceable to meet training and readiness requirements in support of concurrent operations | 56.0 | 80.0 | — | 2023.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2022-23 | DR-2176 | % of maritime key fleets that are serviceable to meet training and readiness requirements in support of concurrent operations | 51.2 | 90.0 | — | 2023.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2022-23 | DR-2183 | % of aerospace key fleets that are serviceable to meet training and readiness requirements in support of concurrent operations | 43.88 | 85.0 | — | 2023.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2022-23 | DR-2009 | % of the Regular force Establishment that is filled | 88.7 | 95.0 | 100.0 | 2026.0/3.0 | to be achieved |
| 2022-23 | DR-2213 | % of Reserve force positions that are filled | 75.18 | 95.0 | 100.0 | 2026.0/3.0 | to be achieved |
| 2022-23 | DR-2218 | % of occupations with critical shortfalls | 70.0 | — | 5.0 | 2023.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2022-23 | DR-1298 | % of capital equipment projects that remain within most recent approved expenditure authority | 88.0 | 100.0 | — | 2023.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2022-23 | DR-1545 | % of capital equipment projects that remain on most recent approved schedule | 81.0 | 100.0 | — | 2023.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2022-23 | DR-2001 | % of capital equipment projects that remain in most recent approved scope | 94.0 | 100.0 | — | 2023.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2023-24 | DR-1995 | % of force elements that are ready for operations in accordance with established targets | 67.0 | 100.0 | — | 2025.0/3.0 | to be achieved |
| 2023-24 | DR-2007 | % of key land fleets that are serviceable to meet training and readiness requirements in support of concurrent operations | 49.0 | 80.0 | — | 2024.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2023-24 | DR-2176 | % of maritime key fleets that are serviceable to meet training and readiness requirements in support of concurrent operations | 45.73 | 90.0 | — | 2024.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2023-24 | DR-2183 | % of aerospace key fleets that are serviceable to meet training and readiness requirements in support of concurrent operations | 48.9 | 85.0 | — | 2024.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2023-24 | DR-2009 | % of the Regular Force Establishment that is filled | 89.1 | 95.0 | — | 2026.0/3.0 | to be achieved |
| 2023-24 | DR-2213 | % of Reserve Force positions that are filled | 77.58 | 95.0 | — | 2026.0/3.0 | to be achieved |
| 2023-24 | DR-2218 | % of occupations with critical shortfalls | 72.9 | — | 5.0 | 2024.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2023-24 | DR-1298 | % of capital equipment projects that remain within the most recent approved expenditure authority as forecasted for the fiscal year | 93.0 | 100.0 | — | 2024.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2023-24 | DR-1545 | % of capital equipment projects that remain on most recent approved schedule | 93.0 | 100.0 | — | 2024.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2023-24 | DR-2001 | % of capital equipment projects that remain in most recent approved scope | 100.0 | 100.0 | — | 2024.0/3.0 | met |
| 2024-25 | DR-1995 | % of force elements that are ready for operations in accordance with established targets | 61.3 | 90.0 | — | 2025.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2024-25 | DR-2176 | % of maritime key fleets that are serviceable to meet training, readiness, and operational requirements | 59.6 | 60.0 | — | 2025.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2024-25 | DR-2861 | % of planned readiness achieved for core concurrent mission set | 30.0 | 90.0 | — | 2025.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2024-25 | DR-2862 | % of land key fleets that are serviceable to meet training, readiness and operational requirements | 51.0 | 70.0 | — | 2025.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2024-25 | DR-2863 | % of aerospace key fleets that are serviceable to meet training, readiness, and operational requirements | 42.3 | 85.0 | — | 2028.0/3.0 | to be achieved |
| 2024-25 | DR-2009 | % of the Regular Force Establishment that is filled | 91.9 | 95.0 | — | 2026.0/3.0 | to be achieved |
| 2024-25 | DR-2213 | % of Reserve Force positions that are filled | 78.54 | 95.0 | — | 2026.0/3.0 | to be achieved |
| 2024-25 | DR-2218 | % of occupations with critical shortfalls | 69.0 | — | 5.0 | 2025.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2024-25 | DR-2868 | % of capital equipment projects that remain in most recent approved scope | 94.0 | 90.0 | — | 2025.0/3.0 | met |
| 2024-25 | DR-2869 | % of capital equipment projects that remain on most recent approved schedule | 44.0 | 90.0 | — | 2025.0/3.0 | not met |
| 2024-25 | DR-2870 | % of capital equipment projects that remain within the most recent approved expenditure authority | 75.0 | 90.0 | — | 2025.0/3.0 | not met |
Separate plans: no outcome has been substituted
| Plan fiscal year | Indicator | Published label | Minimum target (%) | Maximum target (%) | Recorded target year/month |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-26 | DR-1995 | % of force elements that are ready for operations in accordance with established targets | 90.0 | — | 2032.0/3.0 |
| 2025-26 | DR-2176 | % of maritime key fleets that are serviceable to meet training, readiness, and operational requirements | 60.0 | — | 2032.0/3.0 |
| 2025-26 | DR-2861 | % of planned readiness achieved for core concurrent mission set | 90.0 | — | 2032.0/3.0 |
| 2025-26 | DR-2862 | % of land key fleets that are serviceable to meet training, readiness and operational requirements | 70.0 | — | 2032.0/3.0 |
| 2025-26 | DR-2863 | % of aerospace key fleets that are serviceable to meet training, readiness, and operational requirements | 70.0 | — | 2032.0/3.0 |
| 2025-26 | DR-2009 | % of the Regular Force Establishment that is filled | 95.0 | — | 2027.0/3.0 |
| 2025-26 | DR-2213 | % of Reserve Force positions that are filled | 95.0 | — | 2032.0/3.0 |
| 2025-26 | DR-2218 | % of occupations with critical shortfalls | — | 5.0 | 2032.0/3.0 |
| 2025-26 | DR-2868 | % of capital equipment projects that remain in most recent approved scope | 90.0 | — | 2026.0/3.0 |
| 2025-26 | DR-2869 | % of capital equipment projects that remain on most recent approved schedule | 90.0 | — | 2026.0/3.0 |
| 2025-26 | DR-2870 | % of capital equipment projects that remain within the most recent approved expenditure authority | 90.0 | — | 2026.0/3.0 |
| 2026-27 | DR-1995 | % of force elements that are ready for operations in accordance with established targets | 90.0 | — | 2032.0/3.0 |
| 2026-27 | DR-2176 | % of maritime key fleets that are serviceable to meet training, readiness, and operational requirements | 75.0 | — | 2036.0/3.0 |
| 2026-27 | DR-2861 | % of planned readiness achieved for core concurrent mission set | 90.0 | — | 2032.0/3.0 |
| 2026-27 | DR-2862 | % of land key fleets that are serviceable to meet training, readiness, and operational requirements | 80.0 | — | 2036.0/3.0 |
| 2026-27 | DR-2863 | % of aerospace key fleets that are serviceable to meet training, readiness, and operational requirements | 85.0 | — | 2036.0/3.0 |
| 2026-27 | DR-2009 | % of the Regular Force Establishment that is filled | 95.0 | — | 2027.0/3.0 |
| 2026-27 | DR-2213 | % of Reserve Force positions that are filled | 95.0 | — | 2032.0/3.0 |
| 2026-27 | DR-2218 | % of occupations with critical shortfalls | — | 5.0 | 2032.0/3.0 |
| 2026-27 | DR-2868 | % of capital equipment projects that remain in most recent approved scope | 90.0 | — | 2027.0/3.0 |
| 2026-27 | DR-2869 | % of capital equipment projects that remain on most recent approved schedule | 90.0 | — | 2027.0/3.0 |
| 2026-27 | DR-2870 | % of capital equipment projects that remain within the most recent approved expenditure authority | 90.0 | — | 2027.0/3.0 |
Source: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat — GC InfoBase — performance information by programme and organization. Result and plan rows are separate document types. The archive does not preserve the original Departmental Plan for each result year; a same-row DRR target is not proof of an unchanged original promise.
Chapter 6§
What would settle more of the question
A matched record of spending, trained people, usable equipment and operational output would support a closer test of delivery. The current aggregate record stops before that link.
How do defence dollars translate into deployable capability?
What is missing: The held record contains departmental spending, staffing ratios and self-reported readiness indicators, but no matched public microdata linking each expenditure to a force element’s trained personnel, equipment availability and operational output. Indicator definitions, targets and deadlines change; project indicators use weighted ratings against revised approvals. The Reserve Force label is not measured on its stated establishment basis.
Consequence: The pages report each measure on its own definition and period. They publish neither cost per ready unit nor a composite readiness score, and do not infer what later spending commitments achieved.
The issuer’s definitions and explanations
These are the exact fields in the preserved TBS performance file, including DND’s calculation formulas. Project ratings include partial credit and penalties for traffic-light statuses, weighted for project complexity; they are not shares of projects.
Regular Force establishment filled · DR-2009
Published explanation
Although the target was not met, Regular Force recruiting intake achievements, combined with attrition remaining at expected levels, contributed to a net growth of 2,000 Regular Force members. During the 2024–25 reporting cycle, the target date for achieving this performance indicator was amended to March 2027.
Published methodology
Explanation/rationale: This indicator measures the percentage of Regular Force (RegF) positions in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) currently filled by RegF personnel. This indicator informs the success of recruiting and retention efforts in addition to management of career progressions of individual RegF CAF members. A low indicator response could prompt a review of recruiting practices and policies or retention issues within the CAF's RegF component. Formula/calculation: (Total Canadian Armed Forces Regular Force headcount / Total Regular Force establishment levels for the Canadian Armed Forces) x 100 Measurement strategy: The Director Human Resource Information Management - Human Resources Reporting System - Monthly Establishment and Strength Report will be used to generate this result. This report will include Total Establishment, Total Headcount (strength) and Reg F Manning State. Baseline: 94% Notes/definitions: The regular force establishment level, as directed by Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE), is the number of personnel that the regular force of the Canadian Armed Forces is authorized to employ.
Primary Reserve paid-strength proxy · DR-2213
Published explanation
Accurate reporting of the percentage of positions filled in the Primary Reserve is not currently possible under the current establishment. The data reflected in this report is based on a calculation of the Average Paid Strength (the average number of reservists paid per month over the year) divided by the Total Strength (the total number of individuals enrolled in the Primary Reserve). During the 2024–25 reporting cycle, the target date for achieving this performance indicator was amended to March 2032.
Published methodology
Explanation/rationale: This indicator measures the percentage of Reserve Force (ResF) positions in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) currently filled by ResF personnel. This indicator informs the success of recruiting and retention efforts in addition to management of career progressions of individual ResF CAF members. A low indicator response could prompt a review of recruiting practices and policies or retention issues within the CAF's ResF component. Formula/calculation: Primary Reserve (P Res) Force only: (A Total CAF P Res headcount / Total P Res Force establishment level) x 100 Measurement strategy: Chief Reserves and Cadets to generate HRMS Report ID NDRES005 "Home Strength Comparison to Host employment for the Reserve Force" as of 31 March of each year. This report provides the data to inform the variables in the formula/calculation. Baseline: 79% Notes/definitions: The Primary Reserve Force establishment level is the number of personnel that the Primary Reserve Force of the Canadian Armed Forces is authorized to employ.
Force elements reported ready · DR-1995
Published explanation
The target was not met due to ongoing shortages in sustainment, equipment and personnel. These shortages were intensified by increased demand for force elements supporting Op REASSURANCE in Latvia, which was the primary contributor to this year’s lower result. During the 2024–25 reporting cycle, the target date for achieving this performance indicator was amended to March 2032.
Published methodology
Explanation/rationale: Assess the Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF) capacity to be ready to conduct operations. An insufficient number of ready force elements (the building blocks of operations) could limit CAF capacity and flexibility to conduct one or more concurrent operations and would prompt the need to assess operational capacity gaps. This indicator informs National Defence and CAF activities to design, build, field, sustain and manage the operational capacity required to deliver the full range of Defence operational tasks. Formula/calculation: (# of Force Elements reported as ready / Total # of Force Elements Tasked in the Force Posture and Readiness directive) x 100 Measurement strategy: This indicator assesses the readiness of force elements required to conduct operations as tasked in the Force Posture and Readiness Directive. Data is collected and reported through the Strategic Management and Readiness Tool (SMaRT). Baseline: The baseline to be used corresponds to the first official readiness results as of Summer 2018 which is based on Force Elements presented to the CDS following the CDS directive on Force Posture and Readiness. Notes/definitions: Force Elements: An organizational entity consisting of personnel, resource/equipment and/or infrastructure components which can be force generated and assigned to tasks. Ready/Readiness: The preparedness to respond to government direction, expressed in terms of capability to execute the request and the time to deploy the capability. Force Posture: Sum of elements of all kinds which characterizes a military force relative to a given mission. Target explanation: Canada's defence policy ensures that the Canadian Armed Forces will be prepared to simultaneously conduct operations. This target represents the total number of operations the Canadian Armed Forces are expected to conduct simultaneously as per Strong Secure Engaged. Data collection frequency: Monthly or as requested.
Planned concurrent readiness achieved · DR-2861
Published explanation
This indicator is based on the core missions outlined in Strong, Secure, Engaged. Concurrency goals will be revised to better align with the current geopolitical context, Government of Canada priorities and updated defence policy.
Published methodology
Explanation/rationale: The current security environment forces Canada to respond simultaneously to various domestic and international commitments, which is known as concurrency of operations. As mandated in the defence policy (SSE), certain concurrency operations must be sustained at any given time, and readiness planning must reflect that. The conditions of Force Elements directly influences the possible combinations of force elements required to meet planned concurrency targets. This indicator informs National Defence and CAF activities and prioritization to design, build, field, sustain and manage the operational capacity required to deliver the full range of Defence Operational tasks. Performing poorly in this area would demonstrate that the CAF is unable to sustain the appropriate readiness requirements that have been mandated in the defence policy. Formula/calculation: Using the SMaRT Analytic Data for a Fiscal Year the following calculation will be performed (Volume of ready combination permutation / total volume of all combination permutations ) x100 Measurement strategy: This indicator is used to calculate the current readiness when considering the force Elements required to conduct the planned mission obligations that are laid out in the Defence Policy. The SMaRT leverages all possible sequences of Force Element combinations that can be used to perform a specific mission. These different combinations of force elements are entered into SMaRT and programmed algorithms are used to conduct comparative modelling to identify readiness and DND/CAF's ability to satisfy all missions concurrently through the aggregation and manipulation of all mission permutations. Baseline: Not available until there are 3 years of historical data available Notes/definitions: Force Elements: An organizational entity consisting of personnel, resource/equipment and/or infrastructure components which can be force generated and assigned to tasks. Ready/Readiness: The preparedness to respond to government direction, expressed in terms of capability to execute the request and the time to deploy the capability. Force Posture: Sum of elements of all kinds which characterizes a military force relative to a given mission. Target explanation: Canada's defence policy ensures that the Canadian Armed Forces will be prepared to simultaneously conduct operations. This target represents the total number of operations the Canadian Armed Forces are expected to conduct simultaneously as per Strong Secure Engaged (SSE). Data Collection Frequency: Monthly or as requested.
Maritime key-fleet serviceability · DR-2176
Published explanation
The target was not met due to the low serviceability of key fleets in the first two quarters due to the following reasons: an extended work period for the Halifax class; crewing and materiel issues for the Kingston class; and, mechanical issues on HMCS Windsor. Performance improved in the last two quarters, and targets were met during that period. The 59.6% result is assessed against a target of 60% that accounts for planned maintenance. Achieving 100% serviceability across key fleets at the same time is neither expected nor operationally feasible. During the 2024–25 reporting cycle, the target date for achieving this performance indicator was amended to March 2032.
Published methodology
Explanation/rationale: This indicator measures the percentage of the reporting period during which Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) Key Fleets were serviceable and in a state of readiness for operations and tasking (both Force Generation and Force Employment). If RCN Key Fleets are not serviceable, the impacts will be felt through lowered training availability leading to lower expected levels of operator capability. This may result in a lower operational capability than required by the CDS Directive on Force Posture and Readiness (FP&R). The indicator is used to inform decisions on maintenance cycles, maintenance resources, spares resource requirements, the achievability of operational goals, training needs and methods, and the replacement cycle for Naval vessels. Formula/calculation: (Sum of days in a calendar year that all in-service platforms are serviceable / Sum of all days in a calendar year) x 100 Measurement strategy: Under this indicator, Key Fleets refers to Halifax-class, Kingston-class, Harry DeWolf-class, and Victoria-class vessels. The remainder of the Harry DeWolf-class and the Protecteur-class will be added to this metric as they are brought into the RCN fleet. Baseline: To be determined. Notes/definitions: Serviceable: A vessel is serviceable when it is in a materiel condition such that it can be employed for Naval operations. A ship is considered unserviceable when in a 3rd line work period such as a Docking Work Period (DWP), when in 2nd line work periods such as Extended Work Periods (EWPs), or when a Category 1 Operational Deficiency (OPDEF) has been raised. During other types of 2nd line maintenance periods such as Short Work Periods (SWPs), a ship is normally considered serviceable, and the decision on whether a vessel is deemed serviceable or unserviceable is based on the ship’s reported readiness state. In-Service: Equipment from overall Department of National Defence / Canadian Armed Forces holdings that have been given to the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) for training or readiness activities. A ship is considered unavailable (Not in Service) when in a 3rd line work period such as a Docking Work Period (DWP).
Land key-fleet serviceability · DR-2862
Published explanation
Despite improvements over the previous year, the target was not met due to underfunding of National Procurement, an aging fleet, and high operational tempo. Serviceability is expected to improve as new fleets are introduced, and older ones are divested. The 51% result is assessed against a 70% target that accounts for planned maintenance. Achieving 100% serviceability across key fleets at the same time is neither expected nor operationally feasible. During the 2024–25 reporting cycle, the target date for achieving this performance indicator was amended to March 2032.
Published methodology
Explanation/rationale: This indicator shows the extent to which Canadian Army vehicles are in a mechanical state to be used (serviceable) for training, readiness, and operational requirements. Lack of sufficient serviceable vehicles could result in less than optimal training and operations , as well as loss of knowledge and skills within the Canadian Army. The situational awareness provided by this indicator enables decisions regarding level, duration, and intensity of operations and training activities. It also informs the assessment of requirements for increased support to serviceability (operator and technical maintenance), and oversight of spare parts management. The Army has identified 14 fleets of vehicles and weapons systems that are the most important for foundation training, pre-deployment training and operations. This indicator is expressed as the quantity of serviceable equipment divided by the quantity of equipment in service and in the possession of the primary force generator. In total, this represents approximately 6,000 pieces of equipment. This total will fluctuate as equipment entitlements change, and as equipment is fielded and divested. Formula/calculation: i) Asset serviceability Ratio (in calendar days per year): 365- unserviceable days (days in maintenance) / 365 days ii) Average Fleet serviceability Ratio: Sum of all Asset serviceability Ratios per fleet / Total Fleet Size iii) Average Serviceability across all Fleets: (Sum all Average Fleet Serviceability Ratios / Total Number of Fleets) x100 Measurement strategy: The indicator measures whether the key fleets were serviceable for the Canadian Army (CA) presented as a % of asset units serviceable per Calendar Year. First, the total number of days that an asset unit is serviceable (as a percentage per calendar year) is calculated and summed for each fleet. Then, % of asset units per calendar year for each fleet is summed and divided by the total fleet size and multiplied by 100 to convert to a percentage. Formula will not reach 100% per fleet; the reported result is an average of all fleet serviceability percentages and incorporates scheduled maintenance. Land Key Fleets include: 1. Bison 2. Coyote 3. Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV) 6.0 4. Tracked Light Armoured Vehicle (TLAV) 5. Leopard (Leo) 2 6. Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle (TAPV) 7. Armoured Heavy Support Vehicle System (AHSVS) 8. M777 Howitzer 9. C3 Howitzer 10. Light Support Vehicle Wheel (LSVW) 11. Heavy Logistic Vehicle Wheel (HLVW) 12. Medium Support Vehicle System (MSVS) 13. Military Commercial Off-the Shelf (MilCOTS) 14. Light Utility Vehicle wheel (LUVW). Baseline: To be determined. Notes/definitions : Serviceable: Equipment that the Canadian Army has in its units and can use for training or readiness activity purposes, based on mechanical standards for safety features, major assemblies, suspension, frame, body and weapons systems. Equipment that is not serviceable are those that are undergoing repairs (ex. Open work orders for 1st, 2nd, or 3rd line maintenance). Note that the concept of “serviceable” differs slightly between military environments due to the inherent differences across types of equipment.
Aerospace key-fleet serviceability · DR-2863
Published explanation
The target was not met due to a number of factors including personnel shortages, supply chain disruptions, and the increasing maintenance demands of aging platforms. Planned major maintenance, unplanned equipment problems, underfunding, and obsolescence also affected serviceability. These challenges are expected to persist in the near term, with improvements anticipated as new platforms achieve full operational capability. The 42.3% result is assessed against an 85% target that accounts for planned maintenance. Achieving 100% serviceability across key fleets at the same time is neither expected nor operationally feasible. During the 2024–25 reporting cycle, the target was revised from 85% to 70% as achieving 100% serviceability across key fleets at the same time is unrealistic. The date for achieving this performance indicator was amended to March 2032.
Published methodology
Explanation/rationale: This indicator shows the extent to which Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) aircraft are in a mechanical state to be used (serviceable) for operations and training. Lack of sufficient serviceable aircraft may lead to/could result in less than optimal training and operations, as well as loss of knowledge and skills within the RCAF. The situational awareness provided by this indicator enables decisions regarding level, duration and intensity of operations and training activities. It also informs the assessment of requirements for increased support to serviceability (operator and technical maintenance), and oversight of spare parts management. Formula/calculation: (i) Asset serviceability Ratio (in calendar days per year) 365- unserviceable days (days in maintenance) / 365 days ii) Average Fleet serviceability Ratio: Sum of all Asset serviceability Ratios per fleet / Total Fleet Size iii) Average Serviceability across all Fleets (Sum all Average Fleet Serviceability Ratios / Total Number of Fleets) x100 Measurement strategy : The indicator measures whether the key fleets were serviceable for the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) presented as a % of asset units serviceable per Calendar Year. First, the total number of days that an asset unit is serviceable (as a ratio per calendar year) is calculated and summed for each fleet. Then, ratio of asset units per calendar year for each fleet is summed and divided by the total fleet size and multiplied by 100 to convert to a percentage. Formula will not reach 100% per fleet; the reported result is an average of all fleet serviceability percentages and incorporates scheduled maintenance. Aerospace Key Fleets include: 1. CF188 Hornet 2. CC130 Hercules 3. CC130J Super Hercules 4. CH149 Cormorant 5. CH146 Griffon 6. CC177 Globe Master III 7. CC150 Polaris 8. CC138 Twin Otter 9. CH147 Chinook 10. CP140 Aurora 11. CH148 Cyclone 12. CC144 Challenger 13. CT114 Tutor 14. CT142 DASH-8. Baseline : Not available until there are 3 years of historical data Notes/definitions: Serviceable: Equipment in the possession of the primary force generator that are in service and free of faults that would prevent their safe operation and can be used for training or readiness activity purposes. Unserviceable equipment are those undergoing servicing and repairs (ex. Open work orders for labour, maintenance, spare parts etc). Note that the concept of “serviceable” differs slightly between military environments due to the inherent differences across types of equipment. Primary Force Generator: Royal Canadian Air Force.
Project scope indicator · DR-2868
Published explanation
Published methodology
Explanation/rationale: This indicator measures the degree to which Defence equipment acquisition conforms to the most recently approved project scope. The project scope can be reviewed on a semi-annual basis. If scope is not met, the Materiel Group will not deliver what is expected by the Canadian Armed Forces. The data obtained is used to identify issues such as the degree of change to scope, impact to the project and overall equipment acquisition program performance. Changes to scope would prompt leadership to investigate and manage according to the capability deficiencies identified for the project. Formula/calculation: ((Number of capital equipment projects with scope status of green) +(.5 * (Number of projects with scope status yellow))- (0.5*(Number of projects with scope status red) /Number of capital equipment projects) * 100 Measurement Strategy: Project status is determined based on data from DRMIS and the Project Quad charts updated monthly. Data in DRMIS and Project quad charts are generated by individual Project Managers. Projects are weighted by complexity and risk as follows: -PCRA Level 1 = 1 -PCRA Level 2 = 5 -PCRA Level 3 = 25 -PCRA Level 4 = 25 Baseline: The baseline will be derived from the data from the past 3 FYs. Notes/definitions: DND's Project Approval Directive (PAD) provides direction to DND/CAF project and programme professionals that is consistent with the Government of Canada (GC) Policy on the Planning and Management of Investments and Directive on the Management of Projects and Programme, and includes a clearly defined Project Measurement Protocol (Green, Yellow, Red). Capital equipment projects refers to all major capital projects >$10M.
Project schedule indicator · DR-2869
Published explanation
The target was not met due to a range of factors contributing to project delays. These included aggressive schedule baselines, reprioritization of central resources, staff shortages and reassignments to other projects, procurement timelines and contracting legal issues, technical and qualification issues; interdependencies, and costing challenges.
Published methodology
Explanation/ rationale: This indicator measures the degree to which Defence equipment acquisition conforms to the most recently approved project schedule. The project schedule can be reviewed on a semi-annual basis. If schedule is not met, the impacts could include both capability and financial factors. The data obtained is used to identify issues such as the degree of change to schedule, impact to the project and overall equipment acquisition program performance. Changes to schedule would prompt leadership to investigate and manage according to the capability deficiencies identified for the project. Formula/calculation: ((Number of capital equipment projects with schedule status of green) +(.5 * (Number of projects with schedule status yellow))- (0.5*(Number of projects with schedule status red) /Number of capital equipment projects) * 100 Measurement Strategy: Project status is determined based on data from DRMIS and the Project Quad charts updated monthly. Data in DRMIS and Project quad charts are generated by individual Project Managers. Projects are weighted by complexity and risk as follows: -PCRA Level 1 = 1 -PCRA Level 2 = 5 -PCRA Level 3 = 25 -PCRA Level 4 = 25 Baseline: The baseline will be derived from the data from the past 3 FYs. Notes/definitions: DND's Project Approval Directive (PAD) provides direction to DND/CAF project and programme professionals that is consistent with the Government of Canada (GC) Policy on the Planning and Management of Investments and Directive on the Management of Projects and Programme, and includes a clearly defined Project Measurement Protocol (Green, Yellow, Red). Capital equipment projects refers to all major capital projects >$10M.
Project expenditure-authority indicator · DR-2870
Published explanation
The target was not met due to a range of factors contributing to project delays. These included aggressive schedule baselines, reprioritization of central resources, staff shortages and reassignments to other projects, procurement timelines and contracting legal issues, technical and qualification issues; interdependencies, and costing challenges.
Published methodology
Explanation/ rationale: This indicator measures the degree to which Defence equipment acquisition conforms to the most recently approved expenditure authority. The project expenditure authority can be reviewed on a semi-annual basis. If project costs are not within the approved expenditure authorities impacts may include project completion, capability and overall budget forecasting. The data obtained is used to identify issues such as the degree of change to budget, impact to the project and overall equipment acquisition program performance. Changes to project costs would prompt leadership to investigate and manage according to the capability deficiencies identified for the project. Formula/calculation: ((Number of capital equipment projects with budget status of green) +(.5 * (Number of projects with budget status yellow))- (0.5*(Number of projects with budget status red) /Number of capital equipment projects) * 100 Measurement Strategy: Project status is determined based on data from DRMIS and the Project Quad charts updated monthly. Data in DRMIS and Project quad charts are generated by individual Project Managers. Projects are weighted by complexity and risk as follows: -PCRA Level 1 = 1 -PCRA Level 2 = 5 -PCRA Level 3 = 25 -PCRA Level 4 = 25 Baseline: The baseline will be derived from the data from the past 3 FYs. Notes/definitions: DND's Project Approval Directive (PAD) provides direction to DND/CAF project and programme professionals that is consistent with the Government of Canada (GC) Policy on the Planning and Management of Investments and Directive on the Management of Projects and Programme, and includes a clearly defined Project Measurement Protocol (Green, Yellow, Red). Capital equipment projects refers to all major capital projects >$10M.
Occupations with critical shortfalls · DR-2218
Published explanation
The target was not met due to ongoing shortages in some occupations; however, as a greater portion of the Regular Force Establishment was filled, more occupations are now forecasted to recover within two years. This contributed to an improvement from 72.9% in FY 2023-24. During the 2024–25 reporting cycle, the target date for achieving this performance indicator was amended to March 2032.
Published methodology
Explanation/rationale: This indicator illustrates the number of Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) occupations that are understaffed. Each CAF member is assigned a specific occupation upon enrolment. To ensure operational effectiveness, sufficient numbers of members filling each CAF occupation are required as outlined by Canada's defence policy. This indicator can inform the development of focused recruiting and retention initiatives to relieve personnel shortages in understaffed occupations. Formula/calculation: (# of Regular Force distressed occupations / Total # of Regular Force occupations) x 100 Measurement strategy: Count of the number of Occupations that are below 90% Trained Effective Strength versus Preferred Manning Levels as of 31 March of each year, and which are not forecast to recover within 2 years. Baseline: 17.90% Notes/definitions: An occupation is considered to have a critical shortfall when the number of trained and effective members employed in that occupation is less than 90% of the preferred number, and it is not forecast to recover within 2 years.
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Defence · captured 2026-09-09 · issuer data
Original response SHA-256: 453df0d8f19d28b4cf91bfd45e011ad39731ee8c899521641640695d4db685e5
Resources · captured 2026-09-09 · issuer data
Original response SHA-256: 510188c50020a52f2cac81f122fe2ad460a505939d426b53c8754fcd9d0fd3fc
Contains information licensed under the Open Government Licence – Canada. No government endorsement is implied.
Put DND’s own reporting in the wider federal Delivery Scoreboard →
Directly observed
Unresolved
- The held record contains departmental spending, staffing ratios and self-reported readiness indicators, but no matched public microdata linking each expenditure to a force element’s trained personnel, equipment availability and operational output. Indicator definitions, targets and deadlines change; project indicators use weighted ratings against revised approvals. The Reserve Force label is not measured on its stated establishment basis.
Key evidence
| Issuer | Publication | Published | Vintage | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| North Atlantic Treaty Organisation | Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014-2025) | 2025-06-03 | June 2025 edition, information cut-off 3 June 2025 | Source → |
| Prime Minister's Office (Government of Canada) | Canada's new government is rebuilding, rearming, and reinvesting in the Canadian Armed Forces | 2025-06-09 | News release, 2025-06-09 | Source → |
| Prime Minister's Office (Government of Canada) | Prime Minister Carney announces Canada has achieved the NATO 2% defence spending target | 2026-03-26 | News release, 2026-03-26 | Source → |
| Department of Finance Canada | Federal Budget 2025 ('Canada Strong', tabled 2025-11-04), Chapter 4 | 2025-11-04 | Budget 2025 | Source → |
| Department of National Defence | Departmental Plan 2025-26 | 2025-03-01 | Departmental Plan 2025-26 | — |
| Receiver General for Canada (Public Services and Procurement Canada) | Public Accounts of Canada 2025, Volume II, Section 20: National Defence, Ministry Summary | 2025-11-01 | Public Accounts of Canada 2025 (fiscal year 2024-25, ended 2 | Source → |
| Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer | Update of Canada's Military Expenditure and the NATO 2% Spending Target (BLOG-2425-005-S) | 2024-07-08 | PBO update, 2024-07-08 | Source → |
| Statistics Canada | Gross domestic product, expenditure-based, Canada, quarterly (Table 36-10-0104-01) -- GDP at market prices, current pric | 2026-02-27 | The Daily release 2026-02-27 (covering reference quarter 202 | — |
| North Atlantic Treaty Organisation | Defence Investment of NATO Countries (2014-2026) | 2026-07-07 | 2026 edition, information cut-off 3 July 2026 | Source → |
| North Atlantic Treaty Organisation | Defence Investment Update: Record Spending in Europe and Canada | 2026-07-07 | NATO News article, 2026-07-07 | Source → |
| North Atlantic Treaty Organisation | The Ankara Summit Declaration | 2026-07-08 | Summit declaration, 8 July 2026 | Source → |
| North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Office of the Secretary General) | NATO Secretary General's Annual Report shows significant increase in defence investment from Europe and Canada | 2026-03-26 | NATO News article, 2026-03-26 | Source → |
| Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer | Fiscal Implications of Meeting NATO's 5% Commitment (RP-2526-022-S) | 2026-02-05 | PBO report, 2026-02-05 | Source → |
Method and limitations
- The evidence block selects the Department of National Defence’s core-responsibility results, using the issuer’s indicator identifiers and keeping plans separate. Programme spending and full-time equivalents are summed over distinct programme identifiers within each fiscal year; no core-responsibility total is counted twice. Arithmetic gaps subtract the recorded target from the reported result and are not substituted for the issuer’s status. The page publishes neither a weighted score of its own nor a causal relationship between money and readiness. The only public plan comparison is the latest completed fiscal year: the programme sum of the first planned-spending field matches the original Departmental Plan for that fiscal year and Main Estimates total exactly. Later funding changes mean this is not a cost-overrun measure; earlier plan comparisons are withheld. The Regular Force arc verifies the same headcount/authorized-establishment formula and target in all five source years, retaining changed labels.
- DND results are self-reported. Countability reproduces the published record; it does not independently verify military readiness.
- Spending is nominal, not adjusted for inflation: DND programme expenditure, including internal services. It is not NATO-defined defence expenditure. Programme-level cents sum to $1.35 less than the report’s sum of rounded totals.
- The 2023–24 spending record includes a substantial one-time pension-account credit; a higher nominal total cannot be equated with more equipment or operational capacity.
- The Reserve Force label is retained in the evidence record, but its latest explanation describes average paid strength divided by enrolled strength; no establishment-fill gap is calculated from that proxy.
- Project scope, schedule and budget indicators use weighted traffic-light ratings against the most recent approval; they are not simple shares of projects meeting their original promises.
- Fleet definitions and indicator identifiers changed. Historical rows are preserved separately; new and old identifiers are not spliced into a continuous performance trend.
- The aerospace row retains the structured 85% target and “to be achieved” status. Its explanation records a reduction to 70% and a revised deadline; neither is silently substituted.
- Contains information licensed under the Open Government Licence – Canada.
- NATO's own words, from p.1 of the June 2025 report: 'the figures shown in this report may considerably diverge from those that are referenced by media, published by national authorities or given in national budgets.' Every figure in this entry is restated exactly as its own issuer published it; none is adjudicated against another as more correct.
- Numerator/denominator period mismatch: NATO's figures for Canada are stated on a fiscal-year numerator (NATO's own footnote: 'the fiscal year has been designated by the year which includes the highest number of months: e.g. 2023 represents the fiscal year 2023/2024 for Canada') but a calendar-year-forecast denominator (DG ECFIN/IMF/OECD GDP projections as of NATO's 3 June 2025 cut-off) -- two different observation windows fused into one ratio.
- Denominator source and vintage sensitivity: back-solving NATO's own figures (NATO's own published dollar figure and ratio for fiscal 2025-26) implies a GDP denominator of approximately $3,120,050 million for fiscal 2025-26 -- a forecast made as of NATO's 3 June 2025 cut-off, roughly nine months before that fiscal year closes. Statistics Canada's own already-pinned quarterly nominal GDP series (Statistics Canada table 36-10-0104, quarterly nominal GDP) puts the four quarters spanning Canada's actual fiscal year 2025-26 (April 2025 - March 2026: $3,211,260 million, $3,260,736 million, $3,284,580 million, $3,328,492 million) at an average of approximately $3,271,267 million -- about 4.8% higher than NATO's implied denominator. Recomputing NATO's own $62,713 million defence-expenditure figure against this StatsCan-actual average yields approximately 1.92% rather than 2.01%; the same $62,713 million falls roughly $2,712 million short of a 2%-of-GDP threshold measured against this more current denominator. Dated note, 2026-09-02: the last quarter listed here (January to March 2026) read $3,321,588 million, and the four-quarter average $3,269,541 million, until Statistics Canada restated that quarter in the Q2 2026 National Accounts release of 2026-08-28. The shortfall against the 2% threshold read roughly $2,678 million on the earlier figures. The recomputed ratio reads 1.92% on both sets of figures, so what this sensitivity concludes is unchanged; the restatement moved the dollar amounts it is built from, and both are shown. This is a disclosed sensitivity of the ratio to which GDP figure and vintage is used, not a restatement of NATO's own reported number, and not an assertion that NATO's estimate was wrong at the time it was made -- the NATO defence-spending Brief carries the full worked scenario.
- Scope gap between NATO's counted total and DND's own departmental budget: NATO's 2024e figure for Canada is $44,277 million (NATO's own 2024e figure); DND's own audited departmental actual spending for the closest settled fiscal year (2024-25) is $33,924.8 million -- a gap of roughly $10,352 million for approximately the same period. NATO's own defence-expenditure definition includes items DND's own departmental reporting does not carry in the same line: military and civilian pensions paid via other channels, the Communications Security Establishment, eligible portions of other agencies meeting NATO's 'trained and equipped as military, deployable' test, peacekeeping and humanitarian spending by any ministry, research and development including projects that do not lead to production, and Canada's net contribution to NATO common infrastructure. PBO's own scope note similarly names 'the Canadian Armed Forces, the Department of National Defence, and portions of Veterans Affairs Canada' as within NATO's counted scope. This is why no single Canadian appropriation or Public Accounts line reconciles exactly to NATO's reported total -- the gap is definitional, not a data quality problem.
- Estimate, not audited, status: NATO's 2.01% figure for fiscal 2025-26 is an estimate with a 3 June 2025 cut-off, stated before that fiscal year even closes (31 March 2026). The government's own 2026-03-26 announcement of achievement is a political statement citing preliminary spending ('$63 billion... in the past 10 months'), not an audited figure. The only audited figure in this entry (the audited departmental actual) covers fiscal 2024-25, a year in which NATO's own table shows Canada well below 2% (1.47% estimated). The audited settlement of fiscal 2025-26 -- the year the 2% claim actually concerns -- will not exist until the Public Accounts of Canada 2026, expected autumn 2026; when it does, a future capture appends an audited outcome value here rather than editing any value already published.
- Total authorities and lapse, fiscal 2024-25 (Public Accounts, not separately typed as a values[] entry to keep the role vocabulary to genuinely distinct concepts): Department of National Defence total authorities available were $34,711,513,471, of which $30,584,803,954 was the Main Estimates portion (the rest reaching DND through Supplementary Estimates); $772,147,920 of those authorities lapsed (went unspent and unauthorized to carry forward). The $33,924,795,251 'used' figure is what was actually spent, distinct from both the $30,584,803,954 originally voted and the $34,711,513,471 ultimately authorized.
- DND's own Departmental Plan 2025-26 page could not be independently verified byte-for-byte by this reading -- its planned-spending figure is corroborated only indirectly, via the prior year's Departmental Results Report matching the audited Public Accounts figure exactly.
- This entry does not include a Main Estimates 2026-27 figure for National Defence. Secondary reporting (not a primary Countability source) put it at approximately $48.4 billion voted; the primary Treasury Board Main Estimates 2026-27 page could not be fetched by this reading to confirm the figure to the dollar, so it is omitted here rather than stated on unverified authority.
- This entry is filed under the fiscal domain, the closest existing one; it concerns defence expenditure specifically, and no new domain is created to hold it -- the same convention the federal budgetary-balance entry already established. It carries both linked NATO spending commitments -- the 2%-of-GDP benchmark and the newer 5%-by-2035 guideline -- and the published evidence gap on the missing continuously updated indicator, all read by this Brief.
- Maintained-reading refresh, 2026-07-19: this entry's reading changed on new evidence, not a correction of anything previously wrong. Two pieces of evidence already archived as of the 2026-07-12 pass -- the government's own 2%-achieved announcement of 26 March 2026, and Budget 2025 chapter 4's own citation of the Hague 5% pledge -- had not yet been composed into a recorded value on this entry or into the Brief's rendered reading; they are composed now, for the first time. Newly fetched and archived for this reading: NATO's 2026 edition Defence Investment report (cut-off 2026-07-03), its accompanying news update (2026-07-07), NATO's own March 2026 institutional corroboration that all Allies met the 2%-era guideline, the Ankara Summit's reaffirmation of the Hague pathway (2026-07-08), and the Parliamentary Budget Officer's own costing of the 5% commitment (2026-02-05). All publications in this entry from the Government of Canada, NATO, and the Parliamentary Budget Officer were re-reviewed for rights for this reading and moved from an unrecorded licence status to verbatim-permitted: NATO's website terms (Use of NATO content and brand; NATO Archives copyright page) permit non-commercial use of information with attribution, extending 'Fair Use' to the general public for articles -- covering citation of a published statistic with attribution, not redistribution of NATO's materials; PBO's own Terms and Conditions (pbo-dpb.ca) permit non-commercial reproduction without permission, conditioned on no modification, attribution to the Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, using the most recent version, and naming title/date/URL -- conditions this platform's citation practice already satisfies; Government of Canada sources are covered by the standing, publicly stated Crown Copyright policy (non-commercial reproduction permitted without permission, subject to no revision/adaptation and attribution of title and author organization), corroborated across multiple .gc.ca policy pages though the specific canada.ca terms page itself declined automated fetch (the same condition already recorded for DND's Departmental Plan 2025-26 page). No source is blocked; none required commercial-use permission for the action taken here.
- Definitional break between NATO's 2025 and 2026 report editions (2026-07-19; figures corrected 2026-07-20 on independent re-reading of the source table): the 2026 edition's Table 3 reports Canada's CORE defence expenditure only (2024=1.41%, 2025e=2.03%, 2026e=2.13% of GDP), not the single all-in ratio the 2025 edition reported against the plain 2% guideline (2024e=1.47%, 2025e=2.01%). The two bases are marked non-comparable for the fiscal year they share; for Canada they in fact track each other closely, so the scope change moves the reported ratio very little. Measured on the like-for-like core-only basis NATO itself now uses, Canada's newest reported ratio (2.13%, fiscal 2026-27) sits 1.37 percentage points below the 3.5% core sub-target of NATO's own 5%-by-2035 guideline -- a plain arithmetic difference stated here rather than as a formal resolution comparison, since a country's reported ratio and an institution's forward benchmark carry different geographies (Canada; NATO) that this ledger's comparison mechanism reserves for same-geography, same-or-related-quantity movements. The gap is of similar shape to, but not the same figure as, the original 2%-guideline gap this entry has always carried.
- Licence verification, corrected 2026-07-20: the NATO and Parliamentary Budget Officer publications on this entry are recorded as verbatim-permitted because those issuers' own terms pages were read and are now archived alongside the citations they license. NATO's terms release articles under 'Fair Use' to the general public and require that republished content be clearly credited to NATO; the OPBO's terms permit use or reproduction for personal and non-commercial purposes without permission, conditioned on no modification, attribution, most-recent-version, and title/date/URL. Countability's use here is citation-with-attribution in free public editorial analysis, within both. The Government of Canada publications on this entry are recorded as unread rather than verbatim-permitted: canada.ca's own terms page could not be fetched by this project (it blocks automated retrieval, consistent with the note on DND's Departmental Plan 2025-26 page), so its terms have not been read from the issuer's own bytes. Crown Copyright's general policy is widely stated to permit non-commercial reproduction with attribution, and nothing here suggests this use is restricted -- but an unread licence is recorded unread rather than inferred.
- The NATO 2026-edition report is over the archive store limit (10.2 MB against a 2 MB threshold), so it is hashed and pinned but not stored in-repo, and it carries no text layer -- its figures must be read visually from rendered page images. Reproducing any figure taken from it requires re-fetching the URL and checking the recorded sha256. That was done on 2026-07-20 and the bytes matched.
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